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PURPOSE AND INTRODUCTION
The activities of I. G. Farbenindustrie in the United
States/.1afforded Americans the opportunity to observe Third
Reich activities as they existed in pre-war America.

This pre-

view of Naziism in America helped unite popular opinion against
Hitler.

It is the purpose of this paper to point out the origins

of such a system in this country, the conditions which nurtured
its growth, characteristics of the system, and the steps which
lead to the collapse of the system.

The lack of a detai]ed and

determined policy by the Germans prevented their utilization of
I. G. Farbenindustrie to its upmost strategic value in the area
of economic warfare.

America, on the other hand, lacked a

determined policy to deal with the German menace and had the
Germans been able to follow a directed policy, it would have
been harder for the

u.s.

to remove them from a strengthened

position at a later date.
Farben•s activities in the

u.s.

were of strategic,

rather than tactical value to the Wehrmacht (German armed
forces).

Unlike Farben 1 s European factories, the factories in

the U.S. provided Hitler with no war material; they provided a
greater service--the prevention of production of vital commodities needed by Hitler's enemies.

Farben•s effect on tho u.So

economy was restrictive and regulative, rather than open and
1

2

contributory.

The true strength of Farben•s influence on the

American economy remained hidden until the war broke out and
even after September, 1939, its true strengths and characteristics were not fully understood.

The passage of time has

erased most of the emotional feelings of the war, thus permitting a more meaningful study of the activities of I. G. Farbenindustrie in the U.S. from 1929 until March 11, 1942.
A.

Cartel:

A definition.

The first step to be taken in the study of a cartel,
such as Farben, is the establishment of n good workinp definition
of the term cartel.

The League of Nations in the 1920ts addressed

itself to the cartel problem, and after considerable deliberation,
determined that
cartels are associations of independent undertakings
in the same or similar branches of industry established
with f view to improve conditions of production and
sale.
This definition reflected one aspect of the Leagues naivity,
that is, the failure or inability to realize the long-term consequences that resulted from the lack of proper immediate
corrective action.

Corwin D. Edwards, the noted cartel histori-

an, described cartels as arrangements which have the purpose of
regulating competition in international trade. 2 This definition
will be used in all references to cartels in this paper.
B.

Farbents

~

to Prominence

It would be difficult to begin a study of I. G. Farbenindustrie with the formal foundation of the cartel in 1925.

To

3
understand the reasons for the cartel•s formation, the reader
must know something about economic conditions which shaped prewar Germany.

The real origins of cartels began in late 19th

century Germany.

The period of greatest German cartel growth

was in the economically turbulent years of the 1920•s when the
economy was subjected to frequent recessions.

These economic

upheavals encouraged, and often necessitated, the banding together of German business to eliminate competition whenever
possible.
When the economic distress subsided, the various
businesses tried to disjoin themselves from the combinations
if possible.3

The economic conditions which ushered in the

Third Reich in 1933 sparked a renewed emphasis on cartel formation; a trend which Hitler found politically advantageous to
encourage.4

Hitler's defacto support of cartels gave rise to

the idea that cartels were the product of a totalitarian society
and that totalitarianism was "the final expression of the
reactionary forces stemming from special privilege."5

The

period of German rearmament saw I. G. Farben and the Third
Reich become so intermeshed that one could not exist without
the other.

The use of each by the other helped insure the

apocalyptic events of 1939-1945.
The unfavorable economic aonditions which followed
WWI brought together the eight major German chemical firms in
1925.

Out of this meeting came the formation of the

Interessengmeinshaft (the I.G. in I. G. Farben) which represented a combination of businesses involved in the chemical

4
industry.

This merger marks Farben 1 s birth.
The close association of Farben and the National

Socialists (Nazis) began in 1932.

Farben financially supported

Hitler in return for a pledge by Hitler to establish a synthetic
gasoline plant in Germany.

Farben•s chemists had discovered the

process of hydrogenation which allowed the Germans to extract
petroleum products from coal, which was in great surplus in
Germany.

This process promised Germany self-sufficiency, a

necessary condition in a future war.

The program was accelerated

in the 1933 Four Year Plan and was strengthened with the adoption
of rearmament after 1935 which put demands upon the German petroleum industry.

Another program, that of the development of

synthetic rubber, was needed to supply the needs of the Wehrmacht.
Soon, goals of self-sufficiency in gasoline and rubber became
important.

Germany zealously guarded the secrets of synthetic

product, giving nothing away that would jeopardize German economic monopoly.

The German foreign trade policy from 1935 to 1939

was frequently subjected to policy reversals.

Continuity of a

foreign trade policy was subordinated to the rearmament program.
Such a conflict over rearmament arose between Reichsbankdirektor
Schacht who favored a reduction in arms spending to offset inf lation and Reichspresident·Goring
who urged (in
"

1937) that the

entire economy be placed in a state of "readiness for war within
four years." 6 The Schact-G8ring controversy continued for
several years, eliminating any possibility of a directed policy
on a long-term basis.

5
The strategic value of foreign exchange was realized
by all, but not with uniform and continued attempts to make
good use of this scanty "raw material."

The continually shift-

ing currents of thought about what to do with German assets
abroad wrecked havoc with the exchange program.

General foreign

exchange control was exercised by four agencies.7
Reich Ministry of Economics (ultimate control)
Reichsbank
Foreign Exchange Officer
Supervisory Activities Board
The desire to control foreign trade resulted in the
creation of the Wehrwirtschaft sot'ab

(M11i tary Economic Staff}

in 1935 which approved all cartel arrangements, domestic and
foreign.8

The Amnesty Act of 1936 required all Germans to

register their non-German property with the Reich and further
required the immediate conversion of foreign exchange into German
Reichmarks (RMs).9

The Amnesty Act provided the Reich with a

complete listing of all foreign properties outside of Germany
which were subject to liquidation or transfer at a later date.
The small amount of foreign exchange which flowed into Germany
demanded strict regulation of foreign movies available in trade;
the Wehrwirtschaftsotab and the Amnesty Act are only two examples
of regulatory measures.

Bad feelings soon developed between

those persons whose properties faced liquidation and the Reich
Ministry of Economics (which carried out liquidation.)

The

cost of rearmament demanded the liquidation of many minor properties abroad.

It was decided (in 1937) that assets not

nabsolutely indispensable for the maintenance of German foreign

6

trade."lO

In general, the major businesses and industries re-

mained intact. 11
The need for economic espionage is present in the world
of business is always present and Farben developed a refined
intelligence system in the early 1930•s.

Farben instituted the

VOWI (the Statistical Department) which kept Farben (and later,
the Reich) informed of economic advances in other countries. 12
The Wehrmacht, realizing the value of economic intelligence,
organized its own economic intelligence branch, the Vermillurgstelle

w,

to coordinate the various economic intelligence systems,

including Farben•s.

VOWI operated without much of the bureaucra-

tic red tape of Reich organizations and reached the peak of its
activities in 1937-1938.

With the outbreak of war in Poland,

VOWI became the unofficial center for many Nazi intelligence
systems.

The excellence of its work prevented its merger into
the intelligence system of the OKW (Army Supreme Cornmand). 13

The Reich officials were smart enough not to tamper with this
efficient, functioning system.
Farben•s overseas representatives were both skilled
businessmen and disciplined Nazi party members.

Each man re-

ceived intensive indoctrination and was a member of the German
Labor Front (a Reich "union•t of workers, both white and blue
collar varieties) and each was aware that it was "their special
duty to represent National Socialist Germany. 111 4 With businessmen skilled in commerce and persuasion, it is small wonder that
Farben reached a commanding position in world trade.

7

c.

Farben's Policy Regarding America
The loss of Germany's position as a favored nation in

1936-1937 further complicated the formation of a workable foreign
Prior to 1936, Schacht endeavored to reduce friction

policy.

between the U.S. and Germany in the foreign trade field.

Schacht 1 s

II

fall from power in late 1937 enabled Goring to follow a harder.
line in regards to American trade, and foreign trade in general.
An attempt at moderation was made in 1938 with the personal visit
of Reichsbankdirektor Brinkmann to the U.S.

He referred to trade

relations between the two nations as "the pivot of the entire
German trade policy, or even our general economic policy. 111 .5

His

personal mission failed due in part to adverse effect of the
German occupation of Prague.
The following year, 1939, revealed the threat of a
trade war between the

u.s.

and Germany.

The fear soon passed

and German foreign trade policy entered a new phase prior to

1939, the Germans had considered their assets in America as "a
bond between the two countries."

1.6

The policy of the early

part of 1939 which favored liquidation now shifted to cloaking
of German assets by the summer of the same year.

It appears

strange that the Germans, in the pre-war years favored liquidation and when war approached, the emphasis was placed on
cloaking.

The Germans certainly underestimated the scope and

duration of WW II.
D.

Wartime Measures
A directive from the Reich Ministry of Economics .(RME)

8
dated September 9, 1939, dealt with the protection of German
foreign assets and German trade with neutral countries. 1 7 The
author of this directive, Dr. Gustav Schlotterer as chief of
the Export Department called for the innnediate transfer of
titles of German properties to friendly neutral aliens.18

The

responsibility for all cloaking (concealment of apparent German
control) arrangements was with the parent company.

In spite of

the lateness of such an order, (which points up a lack of coordination between the OKW and the RME) the parent company was
held responsible for all actions of its satellite enterprises.
Cloaking measures involved various schemes which transferred
stock ownership to friendly aliens or dunnny stockholders, stock
transfers between German and neutral companies and the apparent
wholesale selling of German properties when the Germans secretly
controlled vital business functions. 1 9 No matter what method
was used, there was considerable German reliance on the good
faith of the aliens who participated in the cloaking schemes.
The outbreak of war caused a disruption in Farben's
role as a worldwide supplier of chemicals and dyestuffs.

Prior

to the Polish war, Farben accounted for almost 49% of the worldts
chemical sales abroad while the
only 20.7% of the world's sales.

u.s.
20

in comparison, provided
The competition for Latin

American markets was strong, but very lopsided.

Sales figures

for 1938 show that Farben provided 59.9% of Latin America's
chemical purchases while the u.s. only provided 10.6% of the
21
sales.
German trade arrangements with American chemical

9

companies resulted in the virtual
from Latin America.

exclu~ion

of American chemicals

The British blockade of Germany failed to

halt the shipment of Farbents goods abroad.

Farbenrs sales in

1940 show that sales in the amount of 4,005,925 RM (1 RM = $0.40)
were shipped through such neutral areas as Holland, Italy, and
22 These
Siberia to Latin American markets for the most part.
goods, when not shipped in neutral ship3, employed the international postal services, cargo submarines and blockade runners. 2 3
Farben went to great lengths to provide for and protect her Latin
American markets.
The German foreign trade policy of the 1930'n was at
most times confused, and at times, nonexistent.

The changes of

policy (liquidation and cloaking) represented the instability
present in the upper levels of the Retch.

These personality con-

flicts prevented the implementation of a single determined policy,
and when war broke out, there was a great rush to institute n
solid and feasible policy for foreign trade and assets.
transition could not be made smoothly, nor in time.

The

Farben was

able to see what was happening, and within the framework of the
public policy on foreign activities, made some arrangements for
the future which will be discussed later.

Farben•s activities

from 1926 to 1939 can be sunmied up as "one of genius, not bur2
dened with ethical conscience." 4

CHAPTER I
FOR¥illTION OF THE FARBEN EMPIRE IN AMERICA
A.

Activities in

~he

Post-~

Decade

The close of \I'w I saw the U.S. government in control
of all former German properties in America.

The sale of con-

fiscated German chemical corporations was a move to destroying
remaining German influence on the chemical industry.

The German

pharmaceutical grant, Bayer, was sold to Sterling Products, Inc.
who later sold certain portions of Bayer to the American company,
Grasselli Chemical.

In 1923, Bayer of Germany and Grasselli

formed a joint chemical company in America under the Grasselli
name and also formed General Dyestuff Corporation (GDC) to market
the products.

Grasselli sold its former Bayer dyestuffs holdings

to I. G. Farbenindustrie and all other interests to du Pont on
October 20, 1928.

This transfer marks the re-establishment of

the German Chemical Industry in America, in less than ton years
after the Armistice, had regained tho dye business which it had
lost by confiscation. 2 5
The following year, 1929, saw the formal merger of all
of Farben 1 s American holdings with the formation of the American
I. G. Chemical Corporation, essentially a holding company composed of the following holdings. 26
General Aniline (formerly.
Grasselli Dyes)
Agfa-Ansco
50% interest in Winthrop Chemical Corporation

10

11-

50%

interest in Magnesium Development Corporation

The company listed its two-fold objectives on its Certificate
of Incorporation filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1929.

The corporation sought to foster and finance

development of chemical industries in the U.S. and elsewhere,
and secondly, to enter into any and all agreements deemed
27
necessary for the benefit of the corporation.
This drive
for economic supremacy, as mentioned in the objectives, was the
key theme of all of Farben's activities with other businesses;
Farben

(and later, the Reich) were to be strengthened at the

expense of others.
B.

Activities of the Pre-war Decade
The direct Berlin control of I. G. Farben over American

I.G. was well concealed from all non-Farben personnel.

The

board of directors included both Germans and Americans.

American

members of the board included Edsel Ford and Walter Teagle (a
former president of Standard Oil of New Jersey).

Many of the

members of the board were members of the companies associated
with American I. G.

The election of Teagle to the board in 1929

followed a marketing agreement between Farben and Standard Oil
in which American I. G. gained the services of Teagle and a
quantity of Standard Oil stock.

So well concealed was the

Berlin control, that Walter Teagle sincerely pleaded before a
Securities and Exchange Commission investigation of American
I. G. that he did not know who really controlled American

r.

G. 28

The main products produced by American I. G. (and later,
General Aniline) were coal for dyes, chemicals, medicines,

12
cameras, film, and other photographic supplies.
Agfa-Ansco was one of American
The economic power of American
the Depression years.

r.

r.
r.

The firm of

G.•s better known companies.
G. was able to increase in

The areas of concentration by American

G. and Farben will be separately covered in a following

chapter.
The outbreak of the war in Europe made it necessary
for American I. G. to change its name to n less Germon sounding
title.

The change became formal on October 30, 1939, due to be-

lief that German names caused prejudice in this country.

29

Another important development prompted by the rise of
tensions in the late l930•s was Farben•s use an American company,
Chemnyco Inc., as its technological link to Farbenrs American
enterprises.

Farben went to considerable trouble and expense

to maintain Chemnyco•s services in the economic intelligence
field.

Not all German officials involved in economic espionage

were in agreement to the value of Chomnycors services; considerable correspondence between Farben and RME disclose a reluctance
to release funds to pay for Chemnycors services.

The company

gained unwanted publicity when Rudolf Ilger, the vice president,
ordered the company's files burned.30

In normal times, such an

action might have passed without much concern, but not in the
midst of the U.S. government's investigation of the company•s
activities.

This did not improve Farben•s image in America.

The company was paid $16,000 per month for its economic espionage activities.

Farben summed up Chemnycors services in a

letter to RHE dated August 3, 1940:

13
1.
2.

3.

it provided "voluminous information on
American industry,
it served as an agent in negotiations for
American use of Farben 1 s patents,
was tied to Magnesium Development Corporation ~fd the American Magnesium Corporation.

Chemnyco continued its services to Farben even though Farben, due
to problems within RME or U.S. legal actions against Farben, was
unable to pay.

Chemnyco amassed credits with Farben, hoping to

be paid in the future.
A study of the actual stock ownership of General Aniline
will show undeniable German ownership.

The 1940 Annual Report

of General Aniline on file at the Securities and Exchange Commission shows that the Farben sponsored Swiss corporation
Internationale Gesellschaft filrChemishe Unternehmungen (I. G.
Chemie) controlled 77.76% of the General Aniline stock.3 2
Common A stock

388,816 shares
66, 632 shares
176 :!!hares

I. G. Chemie
Osmon A. G.
not disclosed

Common B. stock
650,000
600,000
300,000
500,000

L. D. Pickering & Co.
Chemo Maatschappi
N. V. Maatschappi
Banque Federale

31.71%
29.27%

14. 63%

24.39%

The blocks of stock held by the Maatschappi companies had been
"transferred" to I. G. Chemie after the fall of Holland.

L. D.

Pickering & Co. was an American investment house which handled
Farben's American securities.

The Treasury Department in the

fall of 1940 refused to recognize the transfer of the Maatschappi

14
stock to I. G. Chemie.

This was one of the earliest strong

economic measures taken against Farben to date by the U.S.
government.

The actual ownership of General Aniline stock

shows undeniable German control of the company.
General Aniline, like I. G. Chemie, was a holding
company.

The 1940 Annual Report lists General Anilina•s hold-

ings with a value of $10,880,860 with major holdings in Standard
Oil ($6,979,946), Sterling Products Inc. ($2,424,320) and du Pont

($899,250).33

The holdings represented a considerable investment

in pre-war America.
Stock manipulations were not limited to international

r.

transactions; the attempts by certain American

G. executives

to gain control of General Dyestuff Corporation added to Farben•s
problems of maintaining its economic empire.

The key to control

of General Dyestuff was the stock option clause inserted by I. G.
Farben when GDC became associated with American I. G.

The sales

of stock were controlled by an option device which specified
that each stockholder must sell his holdings to the option holder
at the option price of $100 per share, plus a 6% dividend payable
from the date of the last announced dividena.34

After a long

series of manipulations, the option came to Chenmyco ard D. A.
Scblntz, the leading Chemnyco stockholder.

His plans for control

of GDC were thwarted by the shift of German foreign assets policy
which called for cloaking rather than liquidation.

His plans to

gain a quick profit before liquidation (which never came) were
demolished by the policy change.

He received orders from Farben

15
to sell his stock valued at $460 (on the open markot) and had
to resign from the board at General Aniline.

After the fall of

D. A. Sch:lntz, GDC was able to purchase some of its own stock
which removed considerable foreign control.35

The cloaking

program was speeded up after May, 1940, with the revamping of
the I. G. Farben, I. G. Chemie, and General Aniline rolutionship.
It called for an increase in the use of American personnel and
the elimination of some of the more obvious association of I. G.
Chemie and General Aniline which antagonized many Americans.3 6
Farben generally turned a deaf ear to General Aniline•s requests
for cloaking measures.37

The Reich Ministry of Economics

created a Transaction Section to deal with the necessary
Americanization of German firms.

This section, under the

directorship of Ministerialrat Imhoff never lived up to expectations .38

It was hoped that American fears about German firms

in America would subside.

Farben soon found out that they had

underestimated the American public.

CHAPTER II
FARBEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
Farben's areas of participation in the American economy
show wise foresight and strategic planning.

Farben 1 s participa-

tion was regulative rather than contributive in its position to
the economy; it exerted great concealed pressure upon direction
from Berlin as in the case of synthetic.

Farben's rise to

importance in the U.S. was not accomplished overnight; it was
the product of years of scheming and negotiations.

The result

of such actions was not really felt until the war in Europe
threatened to embroil America.

The effects of Farben's control

were, at the best, generally short-term and overcome by a
directed effort of a united nation in war.
Farbcn's American activities can be broken down into
four main areas:

pharmaceuticals, light weight metals, synthe-

tic gasoline, and synthetic rubber.

The strategic advantage

(or more correctly, the lack) of the use of such products in
wartime is beyond doubt; Farben attempted to deny tho United
States and her allies the use of these vital materials.
1.
in the

u.s.

Company.

Pharmaceuticals - Farbenis pharmaceutical sales
were handled by General Aniline through the Winthrop

General Aniline owned

50%

stock with a value of $125,00o. 39
16

of the Winthrop preferred
Winthrop operated under a

17
Farben license to manufacture pharmaceuticals products, veterinary remedies, and insecticides.

The territorial limitations,

for sale of products, were limited to the continental U.S.,
Canada, and the American possessions.4°

Winthrop chemical con-

trolled the below listed companies.41
H. A. Metz Laboratories
Drug Inc.
United Drug Inc.
Antidolnr Manufacturing Company
Sterling Products Inc.
The British blockade of Germany resulted in the re-definition
of sales territory.

With

r.

G. Farben unable to supply the

pharmaceutical needs of Latin America, Parben 1 s American companies were pressed into service to fill the void.

These

companies directly aided Germany by their sale of pharmacouticals to Latin America in containers which beared a strong resemblance to former German packages.4 2 This fraudulent marketing
had the advantage of appearing to reduce the blockade of Germany.
Farbents sales and production of pharmaceuticals were of minor
importance when compared to her other activities.

The chief

value of Farben•s pharmaceutical activit:tes lay in its advantage
to supplement German drug trade.

When the

u.s.

and Great Britain

realized what Farben was doing, both nations eventually ended
this trade, thus ending any advantage formerly enjoyed.
2.

Light Weight Metals - Farben, in the 1920 1 s and

1930•s, was able to profit from the American competition between
the established aluminum industry and its infant rival industry,
magnesium.

From 1919 to 1927, Dow Chemical and the American

18
Magnesium Corporation (AHC) as a subsidiary of the Aluminum
Company of America (Alcoa) enjoyed the distinction of being the
only producers of domestic magnesium.

The interest of the

aluminum companies in magnesium were ones geared to the displacement of aluminum by its long feared replacement, magnesium.
American thinking in this decade was

p~ared

to the thought of

complete supremacy in the industries; there was no chance for
peaceful co-existence between the two metals.

In 1927, AMC

ceased production of magnesium, giving Dow a monopoly.

Alcoa

became indirectly involved in the aluminum cartel when her
subsidiary, Alted, joined the cartel.

Thus, Alcoa gained some

benefits (guaranteed minimum prices, exclusive marketing territories, etc.) from Altedts participation.
In 1931, Farben, as the chief producer of magnesium
in Germany, entered into an agreement with Alcoa known as the
Alig Agreement.

A joint corporation, Magnesium Development

Corporation (MDC), was formed to supervise the exchange of
magnesium patents between the two sponsors.
a

50%

Farben received

interest in Alcoa's American Magnesium Corporation.

coa•s interests in the agreement were two-fold.43

Al-

First,

Alcoa hoped to secure a powerful position in the rival magnesium
industry, and second, the agreement prevented Farben from
licensing other American firms to produce magnesium.

Production

of American magnesium was set at the low figure of 4,000 tons
yearly.41+
Dow Chemical entered into a patent cross-licensing

19
agreement with MDC on January 1, 1934.45

Dow concluded another

agreement which secured Farben as Dows chief magnesium customer. 46
Britain.

The agreement allowed for token shipments to

Gr~at

In the first two years, Dow sold 3.8 million (out of

a total production of 4.0 million) pounds of aluminum to
Farben.

Due to Farben's preferential customer status, sho

paid 30% less per pound than regular customera.47
These agreements fell into disuse after 1938 when
Germany accelerated her magnesium production while the other
nations produced the metal at cartel's assigned figures.

The

effect of such arbitrary regulation was not really felt until
the U.S. entered; and then, the effects were all too visible.
Defense readiness had been subordinated to the selfish interests
of the aluminum interests.4 8

Farben had developed a domestic

competition into a virtual monopoly, a tribute to German knowhow and American shortsightedness.

3.

Synthetic Gasoline - Discovery of the hydrogena-

tion process by Farben chemists in 1926 thundered both political
and economic triumphs of the first magnitude.4 9

Large scale

production of synthetic gasoline from coal via the hydrogenation
process threatened to upset Standard Oita virtual control of
petroleum production.

On the other hand, the discovery promised

to make Germany self-sufficient in gasoline in a future war, a
long-cherished dream.

On November 9, 1929, the full marriage

of Farben and Standard Oil secured Standard's position in the
oil industry with the exception of Farben's production of
German gasoline.

This Division of Fields Agreement secured

20

Farben•s position in the chemical field worldwide.

The Four

party Agreement called for the creation of a joint corporation,
Standard

r.

G., to exchange processing petroleum secrets as

specified in the Division of Fields Agreement.
gained 80% control of Standard

r.

G.5°

Standard Oil

The joint American

Study Group Company was another company that was formed in the
1929 agreements, founded to develop chemical processes not
included in the Four Party Agreement.

51

Farben and Standard

were equal partners in Jasco, but the majority of work was
done in Standard•s plants.

The Division of Fields and the

Four Party Agreements had the effect of insur·ing Standard 1 s
position outside of Germany but at the cost of retarding any
future serious work in related fields, especially in the field
of synthetic rubber.
Farben, in 1937, undertook to purchase $20 million
worth of aviation gasoline and lubricants from the U.S.
secured the necessary petroleum products in the

u.s.,

Farben

but did

not purchase directly from Standard Oil; Standard did, however,
underwrite Farben 1 s agreements with the American suppliers.
Farben secured the necessary funds from the Reich government
and received no profits for its services;5 2 Farben felt that
it was their moral obligation to help supply Germany's petroleum needs until plants for synthetic gasoline could be built.53
Farben made another petroleum purchase in America in 1938.
Farben secured 500 tons of tetraethyl lead (a necessnry chemical
used in the production of high-octane aviation gasoline) from
the Ethyl Export Corporation, an American firm.

The agreement
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called for Farben to borrow the necessary chemical after posting
a collateral of $900 1 000.54

Again, Standard Oil gave its

support to this transaction and the bargain was concluded.

After

the tetraethyl lead was delivered, Farben notified the Ethyl
Export Corporation of its voluntary forfeiture of the posted
bond.

This good bargain illustrates Farbents use of business

associations to aid the needs of the German war machine.
4.

Synthetic Rubber - The development of synthetic

rubber (buna) was high on the list of national objectives of the
German.

Rubber represented the weakest link in the Gorman war

machine; her enemies, Great Britain, France, and the
trolled the world's supply of natural rubber.

u.s.,

con-

The knowledge

that any fUture war would end German imports of natural rubber,
and the problems arising from the lack of rubber, prompted
Germany to seek a domestic source of rubber.

The 1929 agree-

ments with Standard Oil gave Farben the go-ahead to develop
synthetic rubber alone; Standard Oil could do only smallscale
experimental work with Farben's permission.

Farben, as a re-

sult of the high priority of synthetic rubber development,
could release very few secrets to Standard without finding
itself in serious trouble.55

From 1930 to 1938, Standard Oil

developed its own buna, Butyl, and gave fully detailed information to Farben through Jasco as specified in the 1929 agreements.56
The synthetic rubber situation became somewhat more
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complicated when Goodyear applied for a Farben license in 1937
to produce Farben buna in the U.S.

Farben turned down Goodyear's

request stating that American buna and production techniques
were inferior to Farbenrs and that Farben was prohibited by the
Reich government from granting licenses to non-German companies.5 7
Farbents American patents on their Buna S and Buna N did not expire until 1950 and 1951 and these patents gave Farben exclusive
control of buna production in America.

58

Rejected by Farben, Goodyear made considerable progress
in experimental research and even had plans of competing with
Standard's Butyl in the future if there was a way to circumvent
Farben 1 s control.5 9

The big change in Farben's policy came

after September, 1939, when Farben permitted Standard Oil to
license companies to produce Farben buna.

There were consider-

able stipulations attached which enabled Standard to purchase
up to

75%

of Farben buna produced by the other companies, the

papnent of a high royality to Standard Oil of

75¢

per pound,

and a written understanding that any technological advances
made by the licenses would become exclusive property of Standard
and Farben.

60

It is rather easy to see how synthetic rubber

production in the

u.s.

was severely retarded.

It is interest-

ing to note that there was somewhat of rivalr-J between the
propanets of natural and synthetic rubber (analogous to the
aluminum-magnesium controversy) and that this inability to coexist caused problems in later years.

America, unlike Germany,

failed to realize the consequences of being denied a ready
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source of natural rubber as was the case in early 1942.

This

failure was overcome only by a determined and united effort
by American industry in 1942.

Farben's ability to utilize

American business competition to benefit the war machines of
Nazi Germany is a monument to German efficiency.

CHAPTER III
DISSOLUTION OF THE FARBEN EMPIRE IN AMEBICA
The breakup of Farbents economic empire was a long
overdue action.

The American public was almost inconceivably

unaware of the extent of German control of American industry
and this had the effect of creating a minor flood of muckraking
journalism.

The extent of foreign control pointed up the need

for more government regulation of the economy.
to breakdown in terms of actions taken
A.

by

the

It is possible

u.s.

government.

Investigation of Farben Beg!!,!!
The U.S. Senate took steps to attack the cartel problem

by the appointment of a subcommittee to investigate the "degree
of German control of industries essential to defense through
61
patent pools and other arrangements."
This subcommittee,
formed on January 4, 1941, was headed up by Senator Wheeler.
The investigation was prompted by problems in securing certain
materials (optical goods and plexiglass to name two) that were
used in Lend Lease shipments to Great Britain.

Gorman patents

on these products enabled the Germans to effectively curtail
Lend Lease shipments to England.
Senator 0 •Hahoney, chairman of the Temporary National
Economic· Committee (TNEC), opened the controversy in the light
metals industry.

TNEC, beginning in 1939, began to study
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concentrations of economic power in the

u.s.

The committee

reported on domestic monopolies in many segments of the
American economy.

O•Mahoney lashed out at Alcoa for its

entering into agreements with Farben to secure use of Farben•s
patents.

He felt that Hitler would soon be producing a billion

pounds of aluminum yearly in comparison to America•s production
62
of 327 million pounds per year.
A federal court in New York
returned an indictment against six companies with antitrust
violations.

Companies nruned were Alcoa, Magnesium Development

Corporation, Dow Chemical, General Aniline, and I. G. Farbenindustrie.
for

21~

It was revealed that Germany purchased magnesium

per pound while American purchasers paid

30~

per pound.

President Roosevelt, upon hearing of the price differences, remarked that "the government had a right to take over any plant,
American or foreign. 1163 Note the shift in emphasis from aluminum to magnesium.
Arthur Davis of Alcoa led

seven individuals into

court on February 6, 1941, and all pleaded "not guil tyn to
charges of conspiracy with I. G. Farben. 64

General Aniline

went unrepresented at the hearing until Karl Hockswenter, a
company representative, entered a "not guilty" plea for himself.
He made no plea for the company.

Federal Judge Alfred

c.

Coxe

entered a "not guilty" plea for General Aniline.
The most important single person in the breakup of
Farben was the Assistant Attorney General, Thurman
of the Antitrust Division.

w.

Arnold,

This Harvard trained lawyer was

instrumental in securing convictions, especially Farben' s.
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He knew how to apply all forms of pressure to the involved
companies to secure the truth about their dealings.

It was

said of his trustbusting skill, "It was really simple, and
1165
Thurman perfected the method if he did not invent it.
In
future cases, Arnold used all forms of mass media to encourage
public opinion against the cartels and to urge patent law reforms and stricter antitrust measures.

He mot with considerable,

but not complete, success in the following year.
The Justice Department, under the supervision of
Arnold, opened its investigation of German control on April 10,

1941.

The government subpoenaed the company records of General

Aniline, Sterling Products, and Winthrop Chemical Company.

The

indictment alleged restraint of commerce as specified in the
66
Sherman Antitrust Act.
Attached to each subpoena was a list
of 100 corporations and a court order for each company to report any transactions with the listed companies (which were
German controlled). 6 7 Schering Corporation, subpoenaed earlier,
went on record that "not one per cent of its South American
sales profits go to Germany, either directly or indirectly." 68
The validity

of this statement was questionable.

The investi-

gation had the value of showing the extent of German penetration into the South American drug market.
The British Economic Warfare Ministry under Hugh
Dalton announced, in the beginning of May, 1941, that General
Aniline, Sterling Products, and Schering Corporation were
German controlled.

The report requested the U.S. government
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to freeze all German
B.

assets.

69

Freezing of German Funds
The government ordered the seizure of the funds of

General Aniline on deposit in the National City Bank of Now
York in an attempt to force the Germans to appear at the
magnesium investigation.

The order was issued on May 10; the

investigation began in January.
General Jackson called Farben

11

In the seizure order, Attorney
probably the most powerful

single influence in American industry."70
The sinking of the U.S. destroyer Robin Moor in the
middle of June gave FDR the opportunity to issue his freezing
order of June 14.

There was much speculation about government

actions in regards to German patent rights and many hoped that
the patents would also be frozen.7 1

Attorney General Jackson

estimated that German and Italian assets in the U.S. had a
value in excess of $30q million.

Considerable concern was

expressed over reported Swiss holdings in excess of C1.5
72
billion.
It was realized that much of that sum represented
cloaked German holdings which did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Freezing Order.
The government gained a victory on September

5,

1941,

when Acting Attorney General Biddle announced that Sterling
Products, Bayer, and Alba Pharmaceuticals were enjoined in a
consent decree from association with I. G. Farben. 73

The

consent decree was the result of the investigation of South
American drug sales by Farben's

u.s.

associates.
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c.

General Aniline's Antitrust Case
The final and most important court case against Farben

in 1941 was the case involving General Aniline.

General Aniline,

realizing that they would have to appear in court at some future
date, attempted some belated corrective measures.

A high level

executive shake-up ousted D. A. Schintz as president and elected
his successor, John E. Mack. 74

The Americans had gainro con-

siderable control on the board of directors and were making
moves to prevent the collapse of the company from a federal
take over.

In the middle of October, the government announced

its plans to investigate General Aniline.
The Americans on the board at General Aniline elected
William C. Bullit to the board during the absence of the German
directors, D. A. Schintz, Dro Ernest Schwartz, and Felix
Iselin. 75

The election of Bullit, a personal friend of FDR,

was hoped to reduce the government•s contention that the firm
was openly German.

This relief was short-lived, lasting until

the war broke out.

Two days after the declaration of war by

Germany, the Treasury Department stationed 17 agents on the
76
General Aniline premises to insure stability.
On December 20, the government announced that General
Aniline had been indicted on 3 antitrust violations.

Antitrust

indictments were also returned against the brothers Schintz,
Ernest Schwartz, and

w.

H. vom Rath. 7?

General Aniline and her

German directors pleaded "not guilty."

Joseph O'Connell of the

Treasury Department's Foreign Funds Control Division barred the
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indicted directors from the company's premises.7 8

The barred
men were labeled "personifications of I. G. Farben. 1179 The
government asked for, and received, a postponement of the
trial proceedings to further develop their case.
Secretary of the Treasilry,

!·!01~ gan thau,

anr.ounced thr.. t

the February 16th seizure of G8neral Aniline's stock h&d netted

95c of the common and preferred stock and disclosed that 95r;!. of
the company's debentures were owned by Americans.

General

Aniline mi8ht have been controlled by the Germans but the
company's debt was owned by Americans.

He said that the action

was only temporary and that "the question of ultimate disposition is left open. 1180 This seizure was supposed to relieve the
"mental hardship 11 borne by the An:erican directors who wore later
reduced in number from 12 to 4. 81
Robert McConnell was chosen
to head the company as its new president.
D.

82

Creation of the Office of Alien PropertL Custodian (OAPC)
The Office of Alien Property Custodian was created on

Harch 11, 1942, as defined in &ecutive Order N. 9095. 83

The

Trading }nth the Enemy Act of 1917 had set up a similnr body to
deal with enemy property during ·ww I and Fxecuti ve Order N. 9095
made changes to facilitate the activities of the 1942 OAPc. 84
The creation of this office did not terminate the Treasury Department 1 s dealings with enemy property; it merely created a
division of authorities.

The Treasury Department had sought

to control theenemyts general purchasing power to prevent its
use for purposes contrary to the interests of the United
States. 85

The OAPC dealt with real property and sou8ht to
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remove any potential misuse of property and the prohibition
of all tllllicensed communications by the enemy. 86
The OAPC exercised three forms of control:

the

vesting order which gave the Custodian title to enemy properties, the supervisory order which called for government supervision of a business, and a general order which required
specific persons to perform certain actions.

87

Property controlled by OAPC was valued in excess of

$7 billion which made Custodian Leo T. Crowley a very rich man,
88 This figure included all alien property
at least on paper.
which came under OAPC control; the value of

$456 million.

The Germans after

191~1

rmerrl-y

property was

disagreed over the value

of their now confiscated holdings, a paper by the Reichbank
gave three figures on the value of assets in America, ranging
from $15,747,000 to 077,000,000 dependinB on the agency compiling the report. 89 The paper's only comment about the inconsistency was "but again, there is no way of verifying their
correctness. 1190

Actual German assets in the

u.s.

amounted to

$105 million 9l while U.S. investments in Germany were in ex92
cess of $420 million.
E.

The Standard Oil Controversy
The government opened its attack on Standard Oil on

Earch 26, 1942, statin~ conspiracy with I. G. Farben.

The

charges and countercharges show an honest difference of opinion.
Standard argued that she had gained valuable secrets
from Farben, citing them in the December 25, 1942 issue of
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?etroleum Times. 93

Standard declared that she had gained

knowledge of the production of toluol, used in TNT, by the
hydrogenation process.

Standard also declared that Oppanol,

nn additive to maintain constant lubrtcant viscosity was a
secret gained from Farben.

Standard argued that all these

developments had aided the American war effort.
The men at Farben had also read the Petroleum Times
article.

They called it ''another defense arainst accusations

that AMerica had come off badly as a result of the cooperation
between Standard Oil and Farben. 11 94
for association with Standard.

Farben named three reasons

Standard had specialized petro-

leum experience not available in Germany, Farben wanted no unnecessary competition in tho petroleum business in Germany,
and lastly, that work done at Standard would not have to bo
duplicated by Farben.

They concluded that the U.S. gained no
real secrets from Farben. 9S
II
August von Knieriem, a defendant at the Nurenberg

Trials

com.~ented

on the American methods of resolving the

Standard Oil-Farben controversy.
These reproaches against Standard Oil were
raised in a civilized form of a hearing before a
Senate Committee. But now imnr-ine the situation
of a German firm in 1944 before the neople's Cougt.
I don 1 t believe I need say any more about that.~
The demands of the war eventually caused the government to
postpone most of its proceedings to insure Standard~ full
attention to war production.
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F.

The Controversy Continued
The magazines of the poriod Datd considerable attention

to the problem of foreign control.
changes in the patent system.

Thurman Arnold pleaded for

In tho Atlantic Monthly, he said

that the then present patent system repressed new inventions,
and sought stricter supervision of patents to prevent foreign
control of U.S. patents. 97 Lawrence Langer, a former secretary
of the National Inventors Council, took issue over Arnold•s
proposed patent changes.

He felt that if a person refused to

license his patent (Arnold wanted no exclusive control of a
patent by a single company), that he would be labeled a criminal
according to Arnold•s definition. 98

There was no simple, uni-

versally acceptable solution although some of Arnold's measures
were adopted.
The case of J. R. Bonnar v. U.S. in the U.S. Court of
Claims is an attempt by one person to question the wartime
seizure of General Dyestuff Corporation stock by the U.S. government.

This case shows us in 1969 that we are a product of the

past.

Examination of the records and exhibits of that case

have made this paper possible and did much to stir interest in
Farb en.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
This study

of Farben's activities in the United States

allows a comparison of the state of the art of economic warfare
as it existed in the 1930's.

This very real aspect of total

W.).. ~'

war,not
fully appreciated by the Germans who created it, or
.,
the Americans who felt the effects of it.

The short term

effects of Farben's activities were very real:
of American industries in vital areas.99

the retardation

Tho only reason

American companies entered into cartel arrangements with Farben
was for their economic advancement.

In the over-all view[ the

price paid by America was far in excess of what she received;
the

u.s.

could have developed the various Farben processes in

due time and it should be quite apparent that Germany did not
disclose anything of absolute necessity. 100
The blame for the growth of Farben in this country lay
with the American people and their government; maintenance of
the status quo and fear of rocking the economic boat are to
blame.

q,

The U.S. made attempts to extra.cti itself from the

grasp of Farben only when she saw the true meaning and objectives of Farben.

The activities of the Temporary National

Economic Committee, beginning at the turn of the decade were
•
worthy undertakings but the real problem was not tackled
Until 1941. lOl

Th e U• S • h a d goo d 1 egal weapons to fight the
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problem.

The Sherman Antitrust Act, if properly enforced,

had considerable power.

The lack of initial response to the

cartel problem cannot be attributed to the act's power, but
in the persons who used it.
The Germans, on the other hand, eventually lost everything through human error.

The lack of a consistent foreign

economic policy lost Germany everything.

Without a long-term

economic program on the national level, Farben could hardly be
expected to make any strategic decisions.

Farben's decisions

were generally sound and demonstrated economic genius.

Ameri-

can•s must share their thanks for the fall of Farben between
determined American efforts and blundering on the part of
Nazi economic strategists.
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